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Adversary Ethics: More Dirty Tricks
RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD*
I. Introduction
While much of the academic debate over the excesses of the
adversary system is a simple reflection of the belated integration
of "legal ethics" into law school curricula,' there is a growing con-
cern that certain "wide spread [trial] practices are in need of
change."' 2 Perhaps the most extreme criticism of the prevailing
ethic, whether that prevailing ethic is real or imagined, can be
found in the works of Jeffrey O'Connell, 3 who urges us to abandon
a system of dispute resolution "fraught with a frightening mix-
ture of archaic technology, raw emotionalism, and sly tricks."4
© 1982, by the American Journal of Trial Advocacy.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.S.
1969, Ohio State University; J.D. 1976, Ohio State University.
1. The traditional academic indifference toward "legal ethics" as a separate
course offering is noted in M. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
vii (1979), and Hegland, Moral Dilemmas in Teaching Trial Advocacy, J. LEGAL
ED. 69, 86 n.28 (1982).
2. M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTice 79 (1980). Among the "wide-spread prac-
tices" cited by Judge Frankel are:
.. knowingly presenting false testimony of clients or witnesses; try-
ing by artful cross-examination or other techniques to block the truth,
or to make what is known to be true seem false; and deliberately fail-
ing to reveal evidence that would help the court or jury to achieve an
accurate understanding of the facts.
A more complete list of deceptive practices is set forth in Ordover, The Lawyer as
Liar, 2 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 305, 314 (1979):
... deliberately rais[ing] an objection simply to interfere with his
adversary's flow in opening or summation or to interrupt the witness
solely for the sake of interruption .... Dropping books and parapher-
nalia on the floor to distract the jury during opposing counsel's sum-
mation, influencing jurors with unsubtle remarks or gestures in the
hallway during recess, positioning exhibits not in evidence so that
jurors will see them, quoting out of context or purposely misciting
cases, and even worse, omitting important authorities from briefs and
arguments .... Mhe intentionally misleading question tendered on
cross-examination; the question asked, not in good faith, but merely
to have the jury hear the question... ; and the attempt to coach the
witness while he is on the stand.
3. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY (1979); J. O'CONNELL, EN-
DING INSULT TO INJURY (1975).
4. J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 7 (1975).
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While it is safe to assume that few would fully endorse all of Pro-
fessor O'Connell's criticisms, or share completely his enthusiasm
for major changes in our system of dispute resolution, a handful of
commentators have joined him in identifying and condemning cer-
tain "dirty tricks. "I Unfortunately, only the more theatrical forms
of cheating tend to be catalogued. Moreover, the remedy sug-
gested to the party aggrieved by questionable trial tactics is more
often than not "a well directed crotch kick in retaliation. ' 6
One of my purposes in writing this article is to provide a primer
on the more common forms of cheating employed by trial lawyers.
Another purpose is to suggest that there are antidotes that may
be administered to curb these abuses,7 assuming that trial at-
torneys are alert enough to invoke them, and trial judges are will-
ing to apply them.8
5. See, e.g., McElhaney, Dealing with Dirty Tricks 7 LITIGATION 45 (1981). At
least one law school "skills program" has incorporated materials on "dirty
tricks" to "prepare the fledgling lawyers to deal with [them)." See Ordover, Why
'Dirty Tricks'Are Taught at Emory, NAT'L L.J. June 14, 1982, at 14.
6. J. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY 27 (1975). A more diplomatic, but nonetheless ef-
fective countermeasure for garden variety distractions has been suggested by
Steve Goldberg of the University of Minnesota: "Your honor, may we pause for a,
few moments until (Mr.) - can stop being rude?"
7. Unfortunately, the view seems to be that "dirty tricks" pay due to an
absence of meaningful remedies for the aggrieved party. From the viewpoint of
the plaintiff's lawyer, O'Connell opines in THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY, supra note 3, at
40, that:
It is true that [in the cases discussed] the illicit conduct of the lawyers
resulted in a reversal of the trial court's decision in his favor. But to
the extent that the trickery helped gain a verdict in the first place -
with the realization that it might or might not be appealed and with
the certainty that any verdict can be used as a lever in bargaining
over settlement pending appeal - a lawyer could well conclude that
such tricks are worth a try.
Compare Jeans, supra note 6:
When such a transgression occurs by the plaintiff in a civil case or a
prosecutor in a criminal matter, the opponent may seek appropriate
relief from the trial court. But if the defense attorney has injected the
poison there is little, if any, antidote available. Mistrials are, from a
practical point of view, undesirable (who wants to abort a year of
docket waiting, and the expense of an unfinished trial?) and that ad-
monition to disregard the testimony is meaningless.
8. The primary duty of the court to correct unprofessional conduct has been
forcefully advocated in another context by Professor Freedman in LAWYERS'
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 101-02 (1975).
[Vol. 6:265
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II. Some Preliminaries
Ask any trial attorney to prepare a list of unethical practices
and he will most likely recite incidents in which an opponent in-
jected, or attempted to inject, inadmissible evidence during direct
or cross-examination of a witness. Any proper survey of unethical
trial practices, however, must begin with counsel's preparation for
trial."
A. The Deceptive Trial Brief
It has become common practice for trial counsel in civil cases to
present some form of law brief or trial memorandum to the court,
ostensibly to "simplify the litigation and to reduce substantially
the time that a busy judge must take in understanding the
case."' 0 The trial brief also serves as an opening statement, in-
tended "to persuade the court to shape the record favorably to the
party on whose behalf the brief is submitted."'" The opportunity
to "run one by" in this initial presentation to the court, by distor-
ting fact or law, is widely recognized.12 The disciplinary rules of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which directly address
such deliberate deceptions provide in part:
DR 7-106 Trial Conduct.
(B) In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose:
(1) Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to him to
9. For a discussion of abuses in pleading, discovery, and motion practice, see
Underwood, Dealing with the "Court Crunch": Judicial Control of Adversary
Ethics - The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 625 (1982).
10. R. FIGG, R. MCCULLOUGH, and J. UNDERWOOD, CIVIL TRIAL MANUAL 384
(1974) [Hereinafter cited as FIGG.] See also M. PiTrONI, BRIEF WRITING AND
ARGUMENTATION 4 (3d ed. 1967). The significance of the trial brief in today's
litigation process is noted in Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 709
(7th Cir. 1979).
11. Schumate, The Trial Brief, 5 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 2 at 89, 91 (1966). The trial
brief may also provide a vehicle for persuading the court to preclude opposing
counsel from pursuing improper lines of questioning or argument. Id. at 103 n.1.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-110(B) (1979) requires
service of the trial brief on opposing counsel, unless local practice or a local rule
provides for ex parte submissions. Accord, H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 78 (1953);
CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT I 19(b)(2) (American College of Trial Lawyers 1972).
However, counsel often ignore this rule and not all commentators perceive the ap-
plicability of the Code provision. Compare Schumate, supra, at 92-3; PITTONI,
supra note 10, at 4-5.
12.See Ordover, supra note 2, at 314; Brazil, The Attorney as Victim: Toward
More Candor About the Psychological Price Tag of Litigation Practice, J. LEG.
PROF. 107, 111 (1978).
19821 DIRTY TRICKS
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be directly adverse to the position of his client and which is not
disclosed by opposing counsel.
(C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a
lawyer shall not:
(1 )State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to
believe is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by
admissible evidence.
13
Notwithstanding these comparatively unambiguous standards,
a number of appellate decisions have reported gross violations of
the Code including; statements of purported fact unsupported or
contradicted by the record, 14 distorted quotations,"6 or deliberate
omissions of controlling authority."6 Without question, similar
deception also takes place at the trial level, in both civil and
criminal cases. In fact, misconduct in connection with submis-
sions to the trial court often take extreme forms.' 7 For example, in
Garcia v. Silverman 8 , counsel submitted by motion an order for
the court's signature directing one of the parties, as well as the Ci-
ty of New York (a non-party), to show cause why the City should
not be joined and stayed from enforcing certain administrative
orders pending determination of counsel's motion. Counsel omit-
ted from his papers the fact that similar relief had already been
denied in the same matter by another court after a full trial of the
issues. The court published an opinion denying the relief re-
quested and "as a warning to all members of the bar" announced:
Henceforth, any attorney who submits papers to this court which
deliberately fail to state what prior proceedings have taken place and
deliberately withhold information to inveigle the court into making a
decision it should not make, will be held in contempt of court and the
papers together with all pertinent facts will be submitted to the
Grievance Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York for appropriate actions. "
13. See also A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.3(a) and
3.4(e)(1982).
14. In re Mascolo, 505 F.2d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1974).
15. Quality Molding Co. v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 287 F.2d 313, 316 (7th
Cir. 1961). Compare County of Maricopa v. Maberry, 555 F.2d 207, 222 (9th Cir.
1977).
16. United States v. Burnette-Carter Co., 575 F.2d 587, 589 n.4 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Pizarro v. Luther, 520 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Il. 1981); Garcia v.
Silverman, 70 Misc. 2d 537, 334 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1972);
18. 70 Misc. 2d 537, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 474 (1972).
19. Id. at_, 334 N.Y.S. 2d at 476.
[Vol. 6.265
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In this area, at least, it appears that trial judges will not shrink
from imposing sanctions on errant attorneys once misconduct is
brought to their attention. It is hardly a foregone conclusion,
however, that counsel's deception will be discovered in the
absence of mandatory service of trial briefs on all other parties to
a litigation,0 and local rules requiring that practice would provide
some measure of relief in these instances.
B. The Coached Witness
Discussions of "woodshedding" witnesses tend to conjure up
horror stories, such as that revealed by Max Steuer's cross-
examination in the Triangle Shirt Waist Company Case. Accor-
ding to Irving Younger's engaging account, the prosecutor in that
case "phoneyed up" the evidence, and turned his witnesses into
"human tape recorders" capable of parroting their narrative
testimony over and over again without the slightest degree of
variation.2 Unfortunately, there is no bright line between
refreshing the recollection of a witness and suborning perjury.22
Regarding this concern the Code of Professional Responsibility,
DR 7-102(A)(4) and (6) provides:
(A)In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence
(6) Participate in the creation or presentation of evidence when he
knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false.
20. In Photovest v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d at 710-11, the Court observed:
[W]e are of the opinion that exchange of trial briefs at the time they
are filed with the court is sounder procedure, being one more consis-
tent with the elimination of gamesmanship aspects of litigation and,
indeed, with the quest for truth, presumably the ultimate aim of
adversarial litigation .... The district court judge, particularly in the
case of a long and complex trial, who has entertained incorrect con-
cepts about some aspects of the case during the course of the trial
because of an ex parte brief, is placed in the difficult position of retur-
ning to a status quo ante position prior to engaging in the decisional
process.
The Court made no reference to DR 7-110(B), although the Court took pains to
point out that counsel who presented his brief to the trial judge but not to his op-
ponent did not appear to have been attempting to secure an unfair advantage. Id
at 708.
21. Proceedings at the ABA Annual Meeting in Montreal, Canada on August
12, 1975, reprinted in ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MONOGRAPH No. 1, TheArtof
Cross-Examination (1976).
22. Professor Freedman suggests that the problem is one of the most difficult
in the field of legal ethics, at least when the witness is also the lawyer's client. M.
FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 59 (1975).
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Under these standards the responsibility for preventing false
testimony rests upon trial counsel, who, in civil cases at least, may
call only those witnesses whom he believes are truthful.2" On the
other hand, trial manuals are full of tips on how to "enlist [the
third party witness'] active and partisan support of your case."2
As Freedman notes, the risk of suborning perjury that arises during witness
preparation is sidestepped by the British Barrister, who ordinarily takes no part
in the preparation of witnesses for trial. Id. at 109. Sir William Boulton's CON-
DUCT AND ETIQUETTE AT THE BAR (6th ed. 1975), the more or less official authority
for barristers, provides that:
It is a recognized practice that witnesses (other than the parties and
experts or professional witnesses who are instructing counsel), should
not be present at consultations or conferences with counsel and that
counsel should not interview such witnesses before or during a trial.
I deal here solely with the problem of the coached witness, and will not address
the problem of counsel's presentation of, or argument dependent on, perjured
testimony in criminal cases. On that issue see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-7.7 (1979);
Freedman, Perjury: The Lawyer's Trilemma, 1 LITIGATION 26 (1975); Ordover,
supra note 2; and Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 So. CAL. L. REV. 809 (1977). In
State v. McCormick, 298 N.C. 788, __, 259 S.E.2d 880, 882 (1979) the court
noted:
It is not improper for an attorney to prepare his witness for trial, to
explain the applicable law in any given situation and to go over before
trial the attorney's questions and the witness' answers so that the
witness will be ready for his appearance in court, will be more at ease
because he knows what to expect, and will give his testimony in the
most effective manner that he can. Such preparation is the mark of a
good trial lawyer... and is to be commended because it provides a
more efficient administration of justice and saves court time ....
Nothing improper has occurred so long as the attorney is preparing
the witness to give the witness' testimony at trial and not the
testimony that the attorney has placed in the witness' mouth and not
false or perjured testimony .... The sanctions of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility are there for the attorney who goes beyond
preparing a witness to testify to that about which the witness has
knowledge and instead procures false or perjured testimony.
Compare, R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS § 2.14 (2d ed. 1973).
23. In re Schapiro, 144 A.D. 1, -, 128 N.Y.S. 852, 858 (1911). See also In re
A., 276 Or. 225, 554 P.2d 479 (1976) (counsel may not sit silently while a client
testifies incompletely in response to questions asked by opposing counsel). On
the ethical obligations of the criminal defense with regard to non-client perjury,
see People v. Schultheis, - Colo. __, 638 P.2d 8 (1981); State v. Lloyd, 48 Md.
App. 535, 429 A.2d 244 (1981); See also Model Rule 3.4(a) and (b).
24. R. SIMMONS, WINNING BEFORE TRIAL: How To PREPARE CASES FOR THE
BEST SETTLEMENT OR TRIAL RESULT 205 (1974). Simmons recommends, among
other things, that the witness be educated on the merits of the client's case, on
what the witness may do to overcome expected opposition, and that he be
"oriented" by counsel's emphasizing of facts that will help the case and subor-
[Vol. 6:266
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Given such ambiguous advice, to what extent will counsel simply
choose to employ the "lecture," or the technique of suggesting, if
not outlining, a favorable line of testimony to the interviewee at
the outset, and then steering the witness' responses into a
favorable script.25
While it may be assumed that improper coaching of witnesses is
a common phenomenon 26 opposing counsel can expect little, if
any, aid from the trial judge.2 7 In a recent North Carolina case,
the trial judge was rebuked for refusing to allow a witness, who
the court believed had been coached, to testify on the reputation
of another for truth and veracity. The appellate court opined:
When a witness' testimony appears to have been memorized or
rehearsed or it appears that the witness has testified using the at-
torney's words rather than his own or has been improperly coached,
then there are matters to be explored on cross-examination, and the
weight to be given the witness' testimony is for the jury."
dinating inot suppressing) damaging facts. Id. at 205-6. Compare Uviller, The
Advocate, the Truth and Judicial Hackles, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1080-81
(1975), who proposes that the disciplinary rules be amended to provide:
It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to counsel or countenance
testimony by a witness in his favor which, although true in the part
stated, omits matters which if stated might reasonably alter the
meaning or significance of the testimony.
25. The most widely cited example of the "Lecture" may be found in R.
TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 35 (1958):
The lecture is an ancient device that lawyers use to coach their clients
so that the client won't quite know he has been coached and his
lawyer can still preserve the face-saving illusion that he hasn't done
any coaching. For coaching clients, like robbing them, is not only
frowned upon, it is downright unethical and bad, very bad. Hence the
lecture, an artful device as old as the law itself, and one used constant-
ly by some of the nicest and most ethical lawyers in the land. "Who,
me? I didn't tell him to say," the lawyer can later comfort himself. "I
merely explained the law, see." It is a good practice to scowl and
shrug here and add virtuously: "That's my duty, isn't it?"
See also JEANS, supra note 6, at 16-19; MAGuIRE, WEINSTEIN, CHADBOURN &
MANSFIELDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 276-77 (6th ed. 1973).
26. FRANKEL, supra note 2.
27. See 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 788 (Chadbourne rev. 1970):
[The right to prepare witnesses] may be abused, and often is, but to
prevent abuse by any definite rule seems impracticable. It would
seem, therefore, that nothing short of an actual fraudulent conference
could properly be taken notice of; there is no specific rule of behavior
capable of being substituted for the proof of such facts.
28. State v. McCormick, 298 N.C. 788, 259 S.E. 2d 880 (1979).
29. Id. at , 259 S.E. 2d at 882-3. Accord Hanndi & Ibrahim Mango Co. v.
Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 20 F.R.D. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (denying motion to sup-
press deposition). Compare Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S. Ct. 1330,
19821
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Thus, it may very well be that the only protection against the
"coached" witness is self-help in the form of a carefully planned
cross-examination. 0
C. The Last Minute Continuance
Needless delay of litigation is hardly a new phenomenons' nor is
it susceptible to a tidy discussion. Accordingly, the present
47 L. Ed. 2d 592. (1976), reversing a conviction in a case in which the trial judge
had ordered every witness whose testimony was interpreted not to discuss the
case with anyone during recessess. In holding that such sequestration, when ap-
plied to the defendant, violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Chief
Justice wrote:
There are other ways to deal with the problem of possible improper in-
fluence on testimony or "coaching" of a witness short of putting a
barrier between client and counsel for so long a period as 17 hours.
The opposing counsel in the adversary system is not without weapons
to cope with "coached" witnesses. A prosecutor may cross-examine a
defendant as to the extent of any "coaching" during a recess, subject,
of course, to the control of the court. Skillful cross-examination could
develop a record which the prosecutor in closing argument might well
exploit by raising questions as to the defendant's credibility, if it
developed that defense counsel had in fact coached the witness as to
how to respond on the remaining direct examination and on cross-
examination. In addition the trial judge, if he doubts that defense
counsel will observe the ethical limits on guiding witnesses, may
direct that the examination of the witness continue without interrup-
tion until completed. If the judge considers the risk high he may ar-
range the sequence of testimony so that direct and cross-examination
of a witness will be completed without interruption. That this would
not be feasible in some cases due to the length of direct and cross-
examination does not alter the availability, in most cases, of a solu-
tion that does not cut off communication for so long a period as
presented by this record. Inconvenience to the parties, witnesses,
counsel, and court personnel may occasionally result if a luncheon or
other recess is postponed or if a court continues in session several
hours beyond the normal adjournment hour. In this day of crowded
dockets, courts must frequently sit through and beyond normal
recess; convenience occasionally must yield to concern for the in-
tegrity of the trial itself.
See also Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218, 46 A.2d 349 (1946) (cross-
examination of witness who conversed during recess with counsel).
30. Many lawyers opine that the coached witness may be unmasked by well-
placed inquiries regarding the number of consultations the witness had with
others prior to trial. See, e.g., J. BAER & J. BALICER, CROSS-EXAMINATION AND
SUMMATION 97 (1948); L. SCHWARTZ, CROSS-EXAMINATION IN PERSONAL INJURY
ACTIONS 42 (1933). Compare People v. McQuirk, 106 Ill. App. 2d 266, 245 N.E.2d
917 (1969) (skillful but unavailing cross-examination of prosecutrix in rape case).
Thoughtful guidance on cross-examination of the coached witness is presented in
KEETON, supra note 22, at 136-38.
31. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 7 (DeVries ed. 1971):
The little plaintiff or defendant who was promised a new rocking-
[Vol. 6:265
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discussion is limited to delay at the eleventh hour.2 As several
commentators have pointed out, it is not always clear what lies
behind counsel's decision to delay, or whether delay is in the
client's interest or solely the attorney's interest"3
It is sometimes stated that.., the lawyer representing the defendant
should take every opportunity to have the case continued or to delay
its final disposition in any other way .... [But] it does not follow that
the temporary delay that can actually be obtained will benefit the
defendant .... Delays in litigation usually result in greater expense
of trial to both parties, and the necessity for each lawyer's devoting
substantially more time to the case. This is particularly true when the
continuance is obtained so near the trial that each lawyer has
necessarily done a part of the final trial preparation."
horse when Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be settled, has grown up,
possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted away into the other
world. Fair wards of court have faded into mothers and grand-
mothers; a long procession of chancellors has come in and gone
out...; there are not three Jarndyces left upon the earth perhaps,
since old Tom Jarndyce in despair blew his brains out at a coffee-
house in Channery-Lane; but Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its
dreary length before the Court perennially hopeless.
32. For a discussion of delay in connection with discovery and motion practice,
see FIGG, supra note 10.
33. See Miller, A Program for the Elimination of the Hardships of Litigation
Delay, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 402, 409 (1966); Ordover, supra note 2, at 309-10. Zeisel,
Delay by the Parties and Delay by the Courts, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 27, 29 (1962), sug-
gests that:
•.. counsel may not answer a call out of sheer negligence, but it may
also be an intentional move in the interest of his client because, for in-
stance, the evidence is not fully ready for trial, or because counsel
may prefer that settlement negotiations be continued. But even if
counsel should have so many cases on hand that he is forced to
postpone some, such delay might well be construed to be in the in-
terest of his client if the client prefers a delayed trial with this par-
ticular counsel to an earlier trial with a counsel who would be less
busy but also less desirable. Thus, the study does not always permit
us to distinguish betwen delay that is in the client's interest, delay
that is in the counsel's interest, delay that is caused by the counsel's
courtesy to opposing counsel, and delay that is simply due to
negligence.
34. KEETON, supra note 22, at 432-33. Compare, Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda,
Inc., 404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1968) (counsel reprimanded for numerous
postponements of and last minute effort to seek a stay of new trial). On delaying
tactics by the defense in criminal cases see State v. Hansen, 215 N.W.2d 249, 250
(Iowa 1974):
[Wie cannot overlook the conduct of defense counsel, which deserves
our strongest censure as being diliatory, obstructive, and harassing.
Altogether the record shows some 135 filings in the case, almost
100 of them before trial. Many are routine but far too many are peti-
19821
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The Code provides some guidance on the problem of delay:
DR 7-102(19) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1)... delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when
he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve,
merely to harass or maliciously injure another."
Notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the trial judges to enforce
this provision by reason of their regulatory power over members
of the bar practicing before them, 6 judicial control of diliatory
continuances has been less than encouraging. A fairly recent ex-
ample is provided by a Louisiana case, Schulingkamp v. Noonan.3 7
In that case a notice of settling was sent to plaintiff's counsel
three and a half months prior to the trial date, after counsel had
failed to attend a pretrial conference. Counsel had not com-
municated with the client or obtained medical evidence from her
physicians as late as twelve days before trial, and sought a conti-
nuance at the very last minute. The trial judge denied the conti-
nuance. Opining that the mishandling of the case was not at-
tributable to the client, the appellate court ordered the respondent
tions, applications, motions-endlessly repeated-and frequently
without any semblance of merit. At the same time counsel was
trumpeting for a speedy trial and claiming denial of constitutional
rights because the case was so long delayed. We agree with the trial
judge-one of six who became the object of defendant's carping dur-
ing the course of the case-who said defendant was using delay and
hindrance as a ploy to set up a basis for appeal ....
... Lawyers are officers of the court, too, and actions which can most
charitably be described as pettifoggery have no place in the represen-
tation of a client.
See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the
Prosecution Function and the Defense Function (Approved Draft 1971).
35. Model Rule 3.2 clearly acknowledges counsel's duty, as an officer of the
court, to expedite litigation:
Rule 3.2 EXPEDITING LITIGATION: A lawyer shall make reasonable ef-
forts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.
Comment: ... The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in
good faith would regard the course of action as having some substan-
tial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from
otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of
the client.
36. Cf Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 214-15 (N.D. Ill.
1975); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2, Comment (proposed
final draft 1981) ("Any solution must necessarily involve appropriate disciplinary
measures.").
37. 250 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 1971).
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trial judge to vacate his refusal of a continuance, while paying lip
service to the need for judicial control of diliatory practices. 38
Fortunately, other courts have taken a more active role in deter-
ring diliatory conduct. For example, in In re Sutter,3 9 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the trial
court's denial of motions for substitution of counsel and for ad-
journments based upon counsel's claimed lack of preparation, and
assessed $1,500 in costs on counsel for causing a three-day delay
in the start of the trial pursuant to a local rule of court.40
Similarly, in Associated Radio Service Co. v. Page Airways,
Inc.,41 the trial judge required counsel to pay to the opposing
party the expense of unnecessary proceedings caused by their
failure to prepare and provide a court ordered discovery con-
ference report, with directions that counsel not be indemnified by
their clients.4
38. The court noted that:
We believe a court ought to have inherently the power to approp-
riately deal with a lawyer whose discourteous mishandling of a matter
causes trial breakdown and the defeat of the court's judicial function
by loss of a trial day .... In granting the writ, we alternatively
ordered continuance on such-conditions as the trial court considered
just "including an order that present counsel provide the court with
plaintiff's address so that the court may direct plaintiff to employ
other counsel,"... [but] as S. CT. RULE 14 and as State Bar Ass'n
Arts. of Incorporation, art. 12 § 2, grant lawyers a general license to
practice law in the state, and neither trial court nor court of appeal is
authorized to restrict the license.
Id at 480. But see Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 8 L. Ed. 2d
734 (1962), affirming the dismissal of a complaint based on counsel's failure to at-
tend a pretrial conference, and other diliatory conduct.
39. 543 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1976).
40. Rule 8 of the Individual Assignment and Calendar Rules for the Eastern
District of New York provides:
Rule 8. SANCTIONS.
(a) Dismissal or default. Failure of counsel for any party to appear
before the court at a conference, or to complete the necessary prepara-
tions, or to be prepared to proceed to trial at the time set, may be con-
sidered an abandonment of the case or failure to prosecute or defend
diligently, and an appropriate order may be entered against the
defaulting party either with respect to a specific issue or on the entire
case.
(b) Imposition of costs on attorneys. If counsel fails to comply with
Rules 3(f), 6(f) or 7 or a judge finds that the sanctions in subdivision
(a) are either inadequate or unjust to the parties, he may assess
reasonable costs directly against counsel whose action has obstructed
the effective administration of the court's business.
41. 73 F.R.D. 633, 25 F.R. Serv. 2d 218 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
42. See also United States v. Lespier, 558 F.2d 624, 628 (1st Cir. 1977) (assess-
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D. Mary Carter Agreements
The "Mary Carter Agreement," in its most common form, is a
secret settlement contract pursuant to which one of several co-
defendants agrees to pay plaintiff some amount up to a stated
maximum to be reduced or eliminated altogether depending upon
plaintiff's recovery from the remaining co-defendants.' 3 While
such agreements have been upheld in several states, at least when
the agreement had been fully disclosed and when the record did
not provide definite evidence that the participating co-defendant
collusively feigned actual adversity during the trial to the pre-
judice of the non-participating co-defendant," such agreements
have been condemned when they distorted the adversary system
and resulted in sham litigation.
In Daniel v. Penrod Drilling Co.,4 a Jones Act employee of
Penrod sued for injuries suffered aboard a crewboat en route to an
ment of costs and punishment by contempt available for contumaceous behavior
or delaying tactics).
For discussion of the inherent power of courts to levy fines and other sanctions
!on counsel see Note, Civil Procedure - Power of Federal Courts to Discipline At-
torneys for Delay in Pre-Trial Procedure, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 158 (1962); Com-
ment, Attorney's Negligent Failure to Comply with Procedural Deadlines and
Court Calendar Orders - Sanctions, 47 TEx. L. REV. 1198 (1969).
I have not attempted to catalog other strategems designed to hinder the oppo-
nent's preparation, or prolong the proceedings. See, e.g., Kiefel v. Las Vegas Ha-
cienda, Inc., 39 F.R.D. 592, 596 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (improper pressure brought to
bear to prevent appearance of court reporter as -a witness); Kenney v. Superior
Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 106. 63 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1967) ("cornering" medical experts
by placing them on a community "medical committee"); Rousseau v. West Coast
House Movers, 256 Cal. App. 2d 878, 64 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1967); Sweet v. Stutch,
240 Cal. App. 2d 891, 50 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1966) (excessive jury voir dire).
43. The agreement takes its name from Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So.
2d 8 (Fla. App. 1967). Compare ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, Informal Op. 1346 (1977):
If an attorney has entered into an agreement of this nature, the con-
cealment of it or the failure to reveal it could be misleading and decep-
tive to opposing counsel, the court and the jury. Accordingly, we
think that in the interest of complying with the intent of the quoted
Disciplinary Rules [DR1-102 (A)(4); DR 7-102 (A)(6), (7)]. A lawyer
should reveal promptly to opposing counsel and to the court the ex-
istence of any agreements of this nature. This should be done in suffi-
cient time for opposing counsel to be afforded an opportunity to take
appropriate steps and employ proper procedures to safeguard the in-
terests of his clients.
44. See Note, Are Gallagher Covenants Unethical?: An Analysis Under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, 19 ARIM. L. REV. 863 (1977).
45. 393 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. La. 1975).
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offshore location where Penrod was performing services for
Chevron. Chevron was responsible for furnishing transportation
to the offshore job site, and contracted with Popich Brothers to
provide the crewboat. Plaintiff sued Daniel, Popich, and Chevron.
Penrod claimed indemnity from Popich and Chevron, and
Chevron's defense was assumed by Popich. At noon recess on the
first day of trial plaintiff secured an agreement from Penrod's
counsel "not to maintain an agressive, destructive posture vis-a-
vis plaintiff's case, its witnesses, etc." in return for a promise of
Penrod's dismissal, with prejudice, at the close of the evidence.
The agreement was concluded, but was not revealed to the court
and Popich's lawyers until just before the case went to the jury.
After the jury returned a verdict against Popich and Chevron, the
trial judge granted a new trial observing that:
Courts are not mere arenas where games of counsel's skill are played.
Even in football we do not tolerate point shaving. It is perhaps
because the trial is adversary that each side is expected to give its
best, without secret equivocation.' 6
A similar condemnation of the "Mary Carter agreement" was
made in Lum v. Stinnett,1 an opinion which catalogs many of the
strategems facilitated by such agreements. In that case plaintiff
brought a medical malpractice action against three physicians: an
emergency room physician, a family physician, and Dr. Lum, the
physician who read plaintiff's X-rays. All were alleged to have
failed to detect a compression fracture of plaintiff's spine. Prior to
trial plaintiff procured a secret agreement from Dr. Lum's co-
defendants settling the claims against them in return for their
cooperation at trial. Pursuant to the agreement counsel for the
participating co-defendants distorted the jury selection process
and by reserving their opening statements, forced Dr. Lum's
counsel to do the same or risk having no means of meeting the
opening statements of counsel for Dr. Lum's co-defendants. In ad-
dition, plaintiff's counsel managed to call the participating "co-
defendants" as if on cross-examination, allowing him to employ
leading questions at will, and successfully oppose full cross-
examination by Dr. Lum's counsel on the ground that his own in-
terrogations were "cross-examination." Meanwhile, counsel for
Dr. Lum's co-defendants sat placidly, conveying to the jury the
46. Id at 1060.
47. 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
19821
HeinOnline  -- 6 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 277 1982-1983
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
message that only Dr. Lum had cause for concern. This message
was reinforced when the court granted the co-defendant's motions
for dismissal, without opposition, at the close of the plaintiff's
case. Distinguishing cases in which similar agreements had not
resulted in any "diminuation in the vigor" of the co-defendant's
presentation,'8 the court observed that the agreement before it:
called for improper conduct on the part of all attorneys concerned;
and while we recognize they become involved only out of devotion to
their clients, the agreement nonetheless contravened policy express-
ed in the Rules of Professional Conduct .... Such irregularities so
warped presentation of the case as to deny a fair trial.' 9
Given the apparent judicial approval of the "Mary Carter agree-
ment" in several jurisdictions, and its ambiguous status in others,
it must be assumed that the device will continue to flourish. Thus,
the first line of defense of any prudent trial counsel will be formal
discovery of secret settlement agreements so that their details
may be brought to the attention of the trial judge before trial. One
commentator recommends that the following tag interrogatory be
submitted as a matter of routine:
Has the plaintiff entered into any settlement or arrangement with
any party to the suit or with any person potentially liable to the plain-
tiff, and if so, as to each such arrangement, state the particulars and
identify by a sufficient description all documents pertaining to it.M
III. Presenting the Case-In-Chief
A. The Deliberate Injection of Inadmissible Evidence
In spite of the clear dictates of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility that counsel may not "state or allude to any matter that
he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case or that
will not be supported by admissible evidence,"" many lawyers
48. Id at-, 488 P.2d at 351, n.5.
49. Id at __, 488 P.2d at 352-53.
50. G. VETTER, SUCCESSFUL CIVIL LITIGATION: How TO WIN YOUR CASE BEFORE
You ENTER THE COURTROOM 150 (1977).
51. See also ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR7-106(c)(1)(Final Draft 1981). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.4(e)
(Proposed Final Draft 1981):
[A lawyer shall not] in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does
not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by ad-
missible evidence ....
CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT (American College of Trial Lawyers 1972) adds to
these conventional proscriptions a more general proposition, 23(e) and (f), that:
A lawyer should never attempt to place before the court, jury or
278 [Vol. 6:265
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cannot resist the temptation to elicit objectionable and prejudicial
evidence, and then move forward without a pause to preclude ob-
jection or a motion to strike.12 In fact, there is an attitude
prevalent in the trial bar that:
[an] improper question should be asked unless it is of such prejudicial
character that the refusal of the trial court to declare a mistrial would
be reversible error. This practice is sometimes used for the very pur-
pose of confronting adverse counsel with the difficult choice of waiv-
ing objection by failing to make it, or else make an objection that may
lead the jury to conclude that he is attempting to withhold informa-
tion from them."3
Unless trial judges deal sternly with such unfair tactics' the ag-
grieved party will have little recourse. Some examples of improper
questioning on direct and cross-examination illustrate the nature
of such gamesmanship. 5
public evidence which he knows is clearly inadmissible, nor should he
make any remarks or statements which are intended improperly to in-
fluence the outcome of any case.
A"lawyer should not propose a stipulation in the jury's presence
unless he knows or has reason to believe the opposing lawyer will ac-
cept it.
52. See KEETON, supra note 22, at 45.
53. Id at 59. Compare Curtis v. Greenstein Trucking Co., 397 F.2d 483 (7th Cir.
1968) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiff's ask-
ing of objectionable questions, thereby forcing defendants' counsel to make 60
objections, only 7 of which were overruled, did not have a prejudicial effect on the
jury).
Of course, the Code does not prohibit counsel from asking questions merely
because there is some doubt about admissibility, although the better practice is
for counsel to seek a ruling on admissibility before trial, thereby insuring that ex-
pected testimony may properly be incorporated into the opening statement. Cf
County of Maricopa v. Maberry, 555 F.2d 207, 222 n.18 (9th Cir. 1977). There are
many examples of similar misconduct in the presentation of opening statements.
Compare United States v. Schindler, 614 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980) (reference, in
opening statement in mail fraud prosecution, to a witness' concern for her life,
and question on direct examination, "Did you ever have a conversation with Mr.
Schindler during which the subject of contracts to kill someone arose?"); Smith v.
Covell, 100 Cal. App. 3d 947, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377 11980) (reference in opening state-
ment to purported diagnoses that plaintiff's pain was "in her mind, that she has
an antagonism toward her husband and this is her way of punishing her
husband," the statements being without factual support in the record). See also
Note, The Scope of Permissible Comment In A Civil Action In Kentucky, 58 Ky.
L. J. 512, 520-25 (1970).
54. See text at note 22, supra.
55. Although the reading of part III suggests that discussion might be limited
to the direct examination of witnesses, the same problems are encountered on
cross-examination, and cases involving cross-examination are cited accordingly.
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A classic example of the injection of inadmissible evidence oc-
curred in Fike v. Grant,56 in which a "general question" became
the vehicle for a discussion of liability insurance. The daughter of
a personal injury plaintiff testified that on the morning following
the accident she went alone to defendant's place of business, and
then was asked by plaintiff's counsel whether she talked about the
accident:
A. Would you like to know what I asked them?
Q. You may tell all that was said.
A. I went for the purpose of asking Mr. and Mrs. Fike -
Q. Just a minute. Speak a little slower and talk to the jury.
A. I went to the Fike's place of business to inquire about the in-
surance on their car and Mr. and Mrs. Fike -
Q. Was that all you asked them?
A. No.
Similar misconduct, clearly calculated, occurred in County of
Maricopa v. Maberry.6 1 During that trial an expert medical
witness testified on behalf of the medical malpractice defendant
that the decedent's death was the result of voluntary ingestion of
a massive dose of amphetamines. At the close of cross-
examination plaintiff's lawyer proceeded:
Q. Doctor, at the time that your deposition was taken, I will ask
you this, sir, isn't it a fact that at one point you interrupted and
said: "Off the record. Come on, Ken -"
[Counsel for defendant): Your Honor, I object.
Q. "Come on, Ken. You've got a damned good case and you know
it." You said that, didn't you, Doctor?
A. I don't recall."
In another case, Brown v. Royalty,6 ' counsel, through the
following line of questioning, deliberately circumvented the trial
judge's ruling that evidence concerning his client's failure to
receive a traffic ticket was inadmissible. He also circumvented his
56. 39 Ariz. 549, 8 P.2d 242 (1932).
57. 555 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1977).
58. The statement referred to was not, in fact, in the deposition. Citing counsel
for violation of DR 7-106(C) the Court observed at 555 F.2d 207, 217 that:
The lawyer did not pause after the objection of his opposing counsel
to permit a statement of grounds for his objection, or permit the
judge to rule, before the witness answered. There could be little doubt
in any experienced trial lawyer's mind hearing this question, in the
manner and sequence in which it was propounded, why it was asked.
59. 535 F.2d 1024 (8th Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 6:265
HeinOnline  -- 6 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 280 1982-1983
stipulation that he would not raise the issue that plaintiff's
medical bills had been paid by a collateral source.
Q. Officer, let me have that [the accident report] again. I think that
covers what I was unable to read. Then, with reference to that
portion of the report on page two, that calls for arrests, you
show none, is that correct?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Mr. Brown, these bills were all paid immediately after they were
incurred, weren't they?
A. No.
Q. Within a month, I am talking about these medical bills.
A. They were paid when I would pay them.
Q. Now, Mr. Brown, you didn't pay those bills, did you?"
B. On Leading Questions
Closely related to the immediately preceding tactics is the prac-
tice of coaching witnesses while they are on the stand by means of
leading questions.
Since the Code of Professional Responsibility does not explicitly
condemn the practice of coaching a witness with leading ques-
tions6' the problems of abuse of this tactic are ever present. Con-
cerning this problem Judge Keeton notes:
60. For examples of similar misconduct, see Mangan v. Broderick and Bascom
Rope Co., 351 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1965) (workmen's compensation); Smith v. Covell,
100 Cal. App. 3d 947, -, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377, 385 (1980) (improper references to
adverse party's wealth); Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 713 (1974) (circumventing rule that prior arrests, or misdemeanor convic-
tions, may not be used to impeach, by questions designed to bring before jury
fact that witness was residing in jail); Cline v. Kirchwehm Bros. Cartage Co., 42
Ill. App. 2d 85, 191 N.E.2d 410 (1963); JEANS, supra note 6, at 29 (deliberate injec-
tion of question suggesting remarriage in a wrongful death case). See also State v.
Haynes, 291 So. 2d 771 (La. 1974) (prosecutor not only deliberately attempted to
question defense lawyer on what defendant had told him, and belittled counsel
before the jury for asserting the attorney-client privilege, but also called defen-
dant's wife to testify and requested that she claim the husband-wife privilege
before the jury, all in violation of ABA STANDARD FOR THE PROSECUTION 5.7).
61. KEETON, supra note 22, at 49, suggests that the following provisions apply:
DR 7-106(C): In appearing in his professional capacity before a
tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
(7) Intentionally or habitually violate any established rule of pro-
cedure or of evidence.
EC 7-25:... a lawyer should not by subterfuge put before a jury mat-
ters which it cannot properly consider.
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The vice of the question is telling the witness what the lawyer wants
him to say. Having received the message, the witness can then
answer a non-leading question in the desired way, even though the
leading question is stricken. Consequently you may sometimes be
tempted to ask a leading question deliberately, realizing that an ob-
jection to it will be sustained. 62
Consider the following line of questioning from a reported case:
[During direct examination of a witness]
Q. Directing your attention back to July, 1966, did you buy some
virgin metal, virgin nickel from anyone in July, 1966?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. Did you buy approximately eleven hundred ninety-nine pounds
of metal back at that time?
A. I did.
[Defense counsel]: I object to leading. He should know how much he
bought.
The Court: I sustain the objection.
[Defense counsel]: I ask that the jury be instructed.
The Court: The jury is instructed they are not to consider the ques-
tion for any purpose. I sustained the objection.
Q. Do you recall how much of this virgin nickel you bought back in
July of 1966?
A. I bought eleven hundred ninety-nine pounds.
[Defense counsel]: I objected after the leading question was asked of
him and he turned around and asked how much. As important as that
is to this case, I object to that being brought into evidence. He put
words in his mouth and then asked him again.
The Court: That's overruled.63
In this example, the court's cautionary instruction was com-
pletely ineffectual, and the jury, in effect, heard the "testimony"
twice.
Experienced trial lawyers will use objections to leading ques-
tions cautiously, fearing that little will be gained by repeated ob-
jections and that such objections might cause resentment on the
part of the jury." All too often the result of this is that the propo-
nent of testimony will be tempted to cross the line between occa-
sional and unconscionable coaching. For example, in Straub v.
62. KEETON, supra note 22, at 49.
63. Lawrence v. Texas, 457 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App. 1970) (the appellate court
stated the conventional rule that a case will not be reversed in the absence of a
showing that the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing leading questions).
64. Compare F. LANE, 2 GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUES § 13.01 (1969).
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Reading Co.,6 an FELA case tried in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, the appellate court observed:
Regarding leading questions, appellee [plaintiff below] asserts that
this problem is within the control of the trial court .... But where
that control is lost or at least palpably ignored and the conduct is a
set pace running the length of the trial which produces a warped ver-
sion of the issues as received by the jury, then that body never did
have the opportunity to pass upon the whole case and judgment
based on that kind of twisted trial must be set aside.
[In the case at bar] little seems to have been left to a spontaneous
explanatory answer. At times the witnesses seemed relatively un-
necessary except as sounding boards."
C. Dumb Shows, Improper Displays and Other Dirty Tricks
The most notorious "dirty tricks" on record consist of ingenious
efforts to distract or mislead the jury by means of "dumb
shows."6 7 Arguably not all "dumb shows" are unethical, however
many are. Fortunately, few attorneys would attempt the more
outlandish exhibitions, but that is not to say that such tricks will
not turn up in tomorrow's reporters.
65. 220 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1955).
66. Id at 179, 182. But see Gardner v. Meyers, 491 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1974)
(leading questions used 81 times, but in the absence of objection at trial issue
could not be heard on appeal).
67. The terminology is from VETTER, supra note 50, at 225. A few examples
related by a variety of commentators should illustrate the nature of such "non-
verbal persuaders."
An artifice often attributed to Clarence Darrow... a nearly invisible
wire is inserted into a cigar so that when the cigar is smoked
everyone's attention will be focused on the ash, which magically does
not fall ....
McElhaney, supra note 5.
I came to court with more than a silver-tongued argument. I brought
an exhibit... an L-shaped package wrapped in... butcher's
paper .... I could see the jurors sizing up my client dressed in
demure gingham, her one good leg in a black stocking, and then shif-
ting their gaze to the L-shaped package and whispering to one
another among themselves.
M. BELLI, MELVIN BELLI: My LIFE ON TRIAL 107-08 (1976).
In one trial in which the client was charged with negligence by a
middle-aged businessman whose wife died in an auto wreck, he had
his attractive blonde secretary come into the courtroom at the end of
the trial and sit next to the widower. Following Mr. -'s instruc-
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tions, she asked the man an innocent question, smiled, patted his
hand and quickly left. "Just one look at the cold expressions on the
lady jurors' faces was enough to tell me that we were home free,"
Mr. - recalls with a smile.
J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY, supra note 3, at 32. The appropriate
response to this ploy is provided by McElhaney, supra note 5:
Q. Who do you work for?
A. The defendant.
Q. Do you have any information about the crash that gave rise to
this case?
A. No.
Q. You leaned over and spoke to [plaintiff] earlier today, didn't
you?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know [plaintiff] socially?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever seen [plaintiff] or talked to [plaintiff] before to-
day?
A. No.
Q. Was [plaintiff] pointed out to you?
A. Yes.
Q. No further questions.
If the kid's a crawler, the best time to let him loose is during final
argument. Imagine that little tyke crawling right up to you (make
sure he comes to you and not the DA, or worse yet, the judge; a smear
of Gerber's peaches around the cuff worked for me) while you're say-
ing, "Don't strike down this good man, father to little Jimmy. Why,
Jimmy!" Pick the child up and give him to Daddy. If the DA objects
and gets them separated, so much the better. Moses himself couldn't
part a father and son without earning disfavor in the eyes of the jury.
Babies are truly miracles of life; they've saved many a father years of
long-distance parenting. If your client's childless, rent a kid for trial.
Wilkes, Life In the Fast Lane: The Adversary Ethics of an Ex-Lawyer, 7
CRIMINAL DEFENSE, March-April 1980 at 11, 12.
... [Hie intended to call the decedent's mother as a witness in a
wrongful death action. He suggested that she might need an inter-
preter since she had immigrated After World War II .... Someone on
plaintiff's side suggested the daughter [and sister of the decedent].
... the bailiff placed a chair next to the witness box. The sister sat in
it facing the jury and out of sight of the judge.
Counsel began his examination. The mother understood and
answered perfectly. The examination continued perfectly. The
daughter did not have to interpret a word. But as counsel began to
ask the mother about the boy, the sister's lip began to quiver. She
soon was stifling sobs.
VETTER, supra note 50, at 227.
When the models were not in use, they rested in direct view of the
jury on the counsel table. It seemed like every time counsel for the
Beechcraft interests looked over, the Beechcraft was positioned so
that it was banking right, flying into the rear of the Cessna.
Id. at 228.
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The most recent "dirty trick" of national notoriety occurred in
United States v. Thoreen.8 Attorney Thoreen represented Sib-
bett, a commercial fisherman who was tried for violating a
preliminary injunction against salmon fishing. In the hope that
the government agent who had cited his client might not be able
to identify him, Thoreen placed a "ringer" next to him at counsel
table in place of the client, without notifying the court or govern-
mental counsel of the substitution. This deception was compound-
ed by counsel's gesturing to the substitute as though he were the
defendant, and allowing to go uncorrected the trial judge's
references to him as the "defendant." After leading two govern-
ment witnesses to misidentify the charlatan, the substitution was
disclosed. Thoreen's tactic was a clear violation of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility,6 9 and resulted in a finding of criminal
contempt.
Another recent instance of gross misconduct was reported in
Richardson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd.,7 0 a suit
for Employer's alleged failure to settle claims in good faith under
the uninsured motorist provisions of an insurance policy. During
the second day of trial, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the
ground that plaintiff's counsel had placed a photo-copy of a legal
newspaper on counsel table, in full view of the jurors, which bore
the headline:
DIDN'T SETTLE IN POLICY LIMITS;
OK MENTAL SUFFERING AWARD
Plaintiff's counsel's transparently lame explanation was that
the newspaper article was reference material, although the case
reported was three years old, and available in the official reports.
By obtaining the cooperation of the trial judge, defense counsel
were able to note the position of the "exhibit" and take
photographs from several points in the courtroom to preserve the
record for appeal. The appellate court opined:
68. 653 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981).
69. The Court cited, inter alia, ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Infor-
mal Op. 914 (1966). Compare Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl.
1947) (reporting the court-martial of a second lieutenant for a similar ploy during
the defense of an American soldier of Mexican descent charged with rape). KBA
v. Taylor, 482 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1974). In re Metzger, 31 Hawaii 929 (1931)
(substituting bogus handwriting exhibit to facilitate cross-examination of expert
witness).
70. 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972).
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As heretofore stated, counsel for plaintiffs stated he had the article on
the table for use in discussing jury instructions "and other leading
points." This excuse is incredible. We cannot help but conclude that
the article with prominent headlines was exposed for the purpose of
influencing the jury. No one knows whether any jurors saw the
headlines, and if so, what, if any effect they had on the jury in its
deliberations. It would appear from the size of the verdicts that the
headlines might have influenced the jury. Under such circumstances
we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting
defendant's motion for mistrial."
D. Some Objections to Objections
Not all trial judges take care to preclude counsel from making
argumentative comments in the course of making objections. 72 As
a result "objections for jury purposes" are not uncommon in
American courtrooms. 73 Such "speaking objections" should be
viewed as a violation of EC 7-25 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, that "a lawyer should not by subterfuge put
before a jury matters which it cannot properly consider. 7 4
However it is often difficult to distinguish a legitimate objection
accompanied by an explanation of grounds from a frivolous objec-
tion used solely for argument.
An example may serve to illustrate the side of the line to which
counsel may not venture.Plaintiff claimed that he injured his back
in a fall. During cross-examination he admitted that he had had
back trouble for ten years, and had taken treatments for it. The
cross-examination sought to explore this avenue further where
upon plaintiff's counsel interrupted:
Just a minute. Let us get these things straight. If you are talking
about things other than the back that is another story. I object to
your suggestion that a cold or bronchitis would have anything to do
71. Id. at __, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 555, Compare Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda,
Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1169 (7th Cir. 1968) (attempt to slip exhibit into jury room
which had been denied admission more than once).
72. KEETON, supra note 22, at 196.
73. Compare M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS 616 (Student ed. 1963):
An exception to the rule of objecting only when counsel is prepared to
sustain the objection is "objection for jury purposes." Every trial
lawyer is familiar with this procedure. It is not unethical if its purpose
is further to emphasize, for example, the limited purpose of the in-
troduction of certain testimony.
74. McElhaney, Making and Meeting Objections, 2 LITIGATION 43 (1975).
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with this. I have the record from which I would like to read; it is the
official company record, the medical record in this case, and I think I
picked out in my direct examination each and every time when there
was anything that could possibly be associated with this back,-if
Your Honor will look at this.
When cross-examination could continue, plaintiff was asked,
Q. How many times did you see Dr. B_ for back trouble?
A. Once.
Q. Just one time?
A. That was caused by my bronchial condition.
Q. Over a period of ten years -.
At this point plaintiff's counsel injected,
That was on account of a bronchial condition the witness said.
Later, one of the plaintiff's medical experts was being cross-
examined regarding plaintiff's history of back pain. The following
colloquy occurred in the presence of the jury:
Q. Mr. S_ has testified that he had pain with his back for 10 years
before his accident, doctor.
[Plaintiff's counsel]: That is not accurate at all, Your Honor, and I ab-
solutely object to Mr. M_ insinuating that sort of thing into this
record because that is not so.
The Court: He said that his back was his weak spot and that he had
trouble with that, but nothing in the way of an accident had been
testified to.
[Plaintiff's counsel]: And moreover he said he had two periods in
which for short periods of time he had some pain in his back and I
have these records right in front of me, now, Mr. M_, you are not
going to put things into this record that aren't in it, and I am going to
stop you.
Let us go right to the record and see. In 1942, Your Honor - I have
all these records right here - in 1942 we have an acute cervical sprain
which lasted 4 1/2 days. Now, there is nothing more on the back until
in 1944, several cervical fractured ribs when he was helping a friend
down the steps, and that was a question of six days. Now, we have
nothing until we get to 1947 when we have the man with an acute
bronchial pneumonia which threw his back out - that is 1947, Your
Hanor.
Now, there is nothing whatsoever between 1947 and 1949, the date of
this accident, which is over two years.
[Defense counsel]: If Your Honor please, I want to point out, in view
of [Plaintiff's counsel's] remarks I want to remind the Court and also
[Plaintiff's counsel] that on the cross examination of Mr. S_ I said
to him: "G_, haven't you had sacroiliac trouble for the past ten
years and received treatment during that time," and after a while he
said yes. Now, that is what I had in mind.
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[Plaintiff's counsel): And all that Mr. S__ meant is that 10 years ago
was the first time that he had anything with his back. But here are
the actual records, and there is no use in trying to insinuate into this
case that here is a man who had trouble within a 10 year period, and
that is not so.
[Defense counsel]: I move for the withdrawal of a juror.
The Court: I think we got that all pretty clearly.
[Defense counsel]: I move for the withdrawal of a juror, if Your Honor
please, that [Plaintiff's counsel] is making statements of fact to the
jury that are not in the record.
[Plaintiff's counsel]: Are you through with this man?
[Defense counsel]: No. I assume that motion is overruled Your Honor?
The Court: Do you want to put a question?
A second of plaintiff's medical witnesses was also cross-
examined to determine if the doctor had been given a history of
plaintiff's prior complaints regarding his back:
Q. Did Mr. S_ tell you whether he had any trouble with his back
before this accident?
A. Yes, I heard a report he had one in 1947 -
[Plaintiff's attorney interrupting]: In 1942 there was something about
bronchial pneumonia and some subluxation of the sacroiliac which
was corrected.
In reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiff the appellate court
opined:
Where the above type of trial tactics is continued for the duration of a
trial as here it is difficult to keep the opinion from being to some ex-
tent a catalogue of illustrative incidents. Therefore pausing for brief
comment on the above related series, we note that the defense at-
torney was unfairly hampered in his cross-examination by [Plaintiff's
attorney]. The latter improperly averted the attention of the jury
from the prior back condition to the bronchitis; he deliberately and
improperly made statements concerning what he called "the medical
record in this case" which was not yet in evidence. In all of this
despite the objections of counsel, the trial court neither admonished
him nor endeavored to advise and guide the jury as to the significance
of these occurrences. The net of it was that the conduct not only re-
mained unchecked but as far as the jury could be expected to unders-
tand was in effect approved by the court."'
Another purpose of "speech-making" is directed not to the jury,
but to the witness, "giving the witness time to think, calling his
75. Straub v. Reading Co., 220 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1955).
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attention indirectly to a trap into which he may be falling, or in-
directly suggesting a good answer."7 6
Professor Jeans suggests that the best antidote for this abusive
objection is a counter-punch: "I object to counsel instructing the
witness as to the desired answer." 7
Finally, almost every trial attorney has encountered an adver-
sary who appears to be objecting solely to disrupt the flow of
testimony,78 or "change the momentum. ' 79 All too often such ob-
jections are simply injected for purposes of harassment. 80
IV. Cross-Examination
Pity the witness:
Of all unfortunate people in this world, none are more entitled to sym-
pathy and commiseration than those whom circumstances oblige to
76. Keeton, supra note 22, at 174-75. For example, from A. NORRILL, TRIAL
DIPLOMACY 58 (2d ed. 1972):
Q. Have you ever talked to anybody about this case?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever talked to a lawyer about the facts of this case?
A. No.
Objection: I'm going to object to this line of cross-examination
because the questions are tricky and not clear to the witness. It's
perfectly obvious that the witness has talked to me in my office and
has talked to his relatives and friends about the case, but only in rela-
tion to what he actually witnessed.
Another example from JEANS, supra note 6, at 360:
Q. How many times was the plaintiff absent from work during this
period of alleged disability?
Lawyer: I object Your Honor, this witness has no specific memory as
to this and besides the work records would be the best evidence.
Court: Overruled.
A. I really have no specific memory as to this.
77. JEANS, supra note 6, at 174.
78. Ordover, supra note 2, at 314.
79. Cf JEANS, supra note 6, at 358-59.
80. Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1165 (7th Cir. 1968). In
the lower court's opinion granting a new trial and assessing costs on the offen-
ding attorney, the trial judge noted at 39 F.R.D. 592, 596:
Counsel for defendant is a lawyer who has had long and extensive
trial experience. These years in the court should have taught him
compassion and a sense of fair play. Instead he seeks to use his ex-
perience to assert and apply every sly trick and strategem to win his
case. He does this with the hope that he can stay within the bounds of
professional ethics. In this instance he has far overstepped the
bounds.
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appear upon the witness stand in court. You are called to the stand
and place your hand upon a copy of the Scriptures in sheepskin bind-
ing, with a cross on the one side and none on the other, to accom-
modate either variety of the Christian faith. You are then arraigned
before two legal gentlemen, one of whom smiles at you blandly
because you are on his side, the other eying you savagely for the op-
posite reason. The gentleman who smiles, proceeds to pump you of all
you know; and having squeezed all he wants out of you, hands you
over to the other, who proceeds to show you that you are entirely
mistaken in all your supposition; that you never saw anything you
have sworn to; that you never saw the defendant in your life; in short,
that you have committed direct perjury. He wants to know if you
have ever been in state prison, and takes your denial with the air of a
man who thinks you ought to have been there, asking all the ques-
tions over again in different ways; and tells you with an awe inspiring
severity, to be very careful what you say. He wants to know if he
understood you to say so and so, and also wants to know whether you
meant something else. Having bullied and scared you out of your
wits, and convicted you in the eyes of the jury of prevarication, he lets
you go. By and by everybody you have fallen out with is put on the
stand to swear that you are the biggest scoundrel they ever knew, and
not to be believed under oath. Then the opposing counsel, in summing
up, paints your moral photograph to the jury as a character fit to be
handed down to time as the typification of infamy - as a man who
has conspired against innocence and virtue, and stands convicted of
the attempt. The judge in his charge tells the jury if they believe your
testimony, etc., indicating that there is even a judicial doubt of your
veracity; and you go home to your wife and family, neighbors and ac-
quaintances, a suspected man - all because of your accidental
presence on an unfortunate occasion! 8'
81. F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROss-ExAMINATION 194-95 (1936). Compare
Commonwealth v. Rooney, 365 Mass. 484, - 313 N.E.2d 105, 112-13 (1974):
[The judicial function] will not long succeed if a witness innocent of
everything except his coincidental presence at a time and place where
something relative to a crime occurred is to be subjected to a bruis-
ing, grueling and abrasive cross-examination in which questions are
loaded with unsupported insinuations of improper motives,
negligence, incompetence, perjury or, worse, suspicion of guilt of the
crime for which the defendant is on trial. The doctor who sutured the
defendant's knife wounds at the hospital emergency room was cross-
examined as though he were a defendant in a malpractice case. The
cross-examination of some of the Common-wealth's witnesses at the
trial of this case violated their right to fair and reasonable treatment,
and evidenced an unwarranted assumption that only the defendant
had rights to be protected. The proper discharge of counsel's duty to
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While attending law school, the would-be trial attorney is drilled
on the cliche that "cross-examination is the most powerful instru-
ment known to the law in eliciting truth, 82 when he should also be
forewarned that:
[I]t is too often the case that [witnesses] are set up as marks to be shot
at." But it certainly is the duty of the law and of the judges to see
that due regard is paid to [the rights of the witness] and that the
witness box does not unnecessarily become, in the words of an old
Southern judge, "the slaughterhouse of reputations .... "83
The following provisions of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility are frequently ignored during the cross-examination of
witnesses, as is illustrated in many judicial opinions:
DR 7-106 Trial Conduct ....
(C)In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a
lawyer shall not:
(1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to
believe is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by
admissible evidence.
(2) Ask any question that he has no reasonable basis to believe is
relevant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or
other person.
(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when
testifying as a witness.
(4) Assert his personal opinion... as to the credibility of a witness,
as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or in-
nocence of an accused; ....
(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is
degrading to a tribunal.
A. Outright Harassment
In each of the following examples counsel's cross-examination
served no legitimate purpose, and was intended to humiliate or
degrade the witness.
his client does not require such an assumption. Equally important,
the integrity and continued efficacy of the judicial process cannot per-
mit it. The judge presiding over the trial of a case has the power to
keep the examination of witnesses within the limits of common decen-
cy and fairness, and he has the duty to exercise that power promptly
and firmly when it becomes necessary to do so.
82. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1362 n.1 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
83. 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 983 (Chadbourn rev. 1970), as cited in State v.
Crawford, 202 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Iowa 1972).
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Counsel for plaintiff approached the defendant, and after ad-
dressing him by name gratuitously added:
Q. The last time I saw you, you had a plastic bag on your head- 84
In another case, counsel, having been admonished not to interject
his personal comments into the examination of witnesses, ap-
proached a prosecution witness who had manifested some inabili-
ty to determine directions on an exhibit at trial:
Q. Have you ever done any flying?
A. No.
Q. I recommend that you don't."
And finally, a frustrated prosecutor, upon encountering difficulty
in eliciting details of a transaction from a somewhat unwilling
witness, asked:
Q. Who told you to have a faulty memory? 6
B. Cross-Examination By Innuendo
One of the most common abuses of cross-examination takes the
form of a question implying a serious charge against the witness,
for which counsel has little or no proof. All too often, trial at-
torneys ask such questions for the sole purpose of "waft[ing] an
unwarranted innuendo into the jury box." 87 On the ethics of such
questioning, Judge Keeton observes:
84. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron workers,
Local 387 v. Moore, 149 Ga. App. 431, 254 S.E.2d 438, (1979) (the court offered
counsel a mistrial).
85. Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, _, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 724
(1974) (counsel held in contempt).
86. Aiuppa v. United States, 393 F.2d 597, 601 (10th Cir. 1968) (holding trial
court's striking the testimony or comment and admonishing the jury to disregard
it was sufficient cure).
87. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481, 69 S. Ct. 213, 221, 93 L. Ed.
168, 176, (1948). Compare Haynes v. State, __, Ind. App .... 411 N.E.2d
659, 665 (1980):
Improper matters cannot be introduced into the awareness of the
trier of fact by formulating a question that is pregnant with an un-
substantiated assertion of fact [citing DR 7-106(C)(2)]
... An attorney should not contrive a cross-examination based
on fictitious assumptions when to do so would only confuse the
fact finder and impede the search for truth.
Accord Love v. Wolf,226 Cal. App. 2d 378, __, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188 (1964) (ac-
cusatory questioning such as "Your job is to make thirty dollars profit on every
one hundred pills, isn't it" and "did you know that.. ." questioning); People ex
[Vol. 6:265
HeinOnline  -- 6 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 292 1982-1983
DIRTY TRICKS
The code is surely violated ... by implication of charges known to be
false, and perhaps it condemns as well those based on mere suspicion
[citing DR 7-106(C)(1), (2) and (7)].88
The trial judge has considerable discretion to limit cross-
examination which is not directed to the real issues of the case,
and which suggests misconduct on the part of the witness.8 9
Moreover, the trial judge may caution counsel or demand a show-
ing of "good faith" as a prerequisite to such cross-examination."
Authority may even be found sustaining the right of the opposing
party to call the cross-examiner to the stand and inquire into the
"good faith basis" for a line of questions29
Unfortunately, the improper examination is not always spotted
for what it is, admonitions are not given by the Court, or admoni-
tions are not heeded. The only remedy left for the aggrieved party
is a new trial. Some illustrations are in order.
In Marsh v. State2 defendant was charged with first degree
murder in the shooting of his father-in-law and was found guilty
reL Dept. of Pub. Works v. Lillard, 219 Cal. App. 2d 368, _ 33 Cal. Rptr. 189,
196 (1963), wherein the court opined:
These "did you know that" questions designed not to obtain informa-
tion or test adverse testimony but to afford cross-examining counsel a
device by which his own unsworn statements can reach the ears of the
jury and be accepted by them as proof have been repeatedly condemn-
ed.
88. KEETON, supra note 22, at 100 n.2. See also Boulton, supra note 22, at 78-79:
In a cross-examination which goes to a matter in issue, it is not im-
proper for counsel to put questions suggesting fraud, misconduct or
the commission of any criminal offense (even though he is not able or
does not intend to exercise the right of calling affirmative evidence to
support or justify the imputation they convey), if he is satisfied that
the matters suggested are part of his client's case and has no reason
to believe that they are only put forward for the purpose of impugn-
ing the witness's character.
Under the rules of evidence, affirmative evidence cannot in general be
called to contradict answers given to questions asked in cross-
examination directed only to credit.
Questions which affect the credibility of a witness by attacking his
character, but are not otherwise relevant to the actual enquiry, ought
not to be asked unless the cross-examiner has reasonable grounds for
thinking that the imputation conveyed by the question is well-
founded or true.
Compare Model Rule 4.4.
89. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 202 N.W.2d 99 (Iowa 1972) (collecting cases).
90. Cf. United States v. Greer, 643 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1981).
91. United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1945). Cf United
States v. Cardarella, 570 F.2d 264, 268 (8th Cir. 1978).
92. -, Ind. App. -, 387 N.E.2d 1346 (1979).
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by reason of insanity. During the cross-examination of the defen-
dant, the prosecutor asked:
Q. Mr. M_, isn't it a fact that the only. time you have sought
psychiatric counseling or have used insanity as a defense are the two
times criminal charges were brought against you, once in December
of 1975 and another time in February of 1972, isn't that a fact, sir?
After a bench conference the prosecutor withdrew the question,
but the trial judge refused to admonish the jury that no such prior
pleas had been interposed. In fact, the 1975 charge was not a
criminal charge, but a civil commitment proceeding instituted by
defendant's wife, and the 1972 charge had been dismissed. In
reversing defendant's conviction, the appellate court observed:
Where counsel elects to attack the credibility of a witness on cross-
examination through questions designed to impeach on collateral
matters, he impliedly represents to the court that he is prepared to
dispute a denial. In order to ask such questions, the attorney must
have a reasonable basis for believing that the answer will be relevant,
that is, impeaching. Without information upon which to form a
reasonable belief that the witness's response will be impeaching, a
reasonable basis for asking a question which is intended to degrade
the witness does not exist. Indeed, if the attorney has no reasonable
basis to believe the question is relevant to the case and the question
degrades the witness, asking it violates Disciplinary Rule DR
7-106(C)(2) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. See also:
Ethical Consideration, EC 7-25. 93
Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc.9 4 not only provides an il-
lustration of improper cross-examination, but also suggests a
meaningful remedy for such abuses. Plaintiff had brought suit
against a motel chain to recover damages from an assault inflicted
by an intruder who gained entry to her room. During his cross-
examinations of plaintiff and her husband defense counsel pro-
pounded questions insinuating that plaintiff and her husband had
had an altercation the previous evening, that her husband had
made numerous calls to plaintiff's room prior to the assault, and
that she recognized the intruder as her husband. When such ques-
93. Id at __, 387 N.E. 2d at 1348. Compare United States v. Haskell, 327
F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1964) (cross-examination based on erroneous FBI "rep sheet"
not reversible error where prosecutor and trial judge moved promptly to correct
erroneous impression that jury might have acquired). See also Dukes v. State,
356 S.2d 873, 875 (Fla. App. 1978); Bagnell v. State, __, Ind. App .....
413 N.E.2d 1072, 1076-78 (1980).
94.39 F.R.D. 592 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1968).
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tions elicited denials, counsel intended that impeachment would
follow, when in fact no impeachment would follow. The trial judge
found that such tactics, coupled with a variety of other abuses,
not only justified a new trial, but also an assessment of costs and
attorney fees against the defendant and defense counsel, jointly
and severally, in the amount of $8,171.56.25
C. The Attorney As A Witness
Closely related to the immediately preceding topic is the pro-
blem of impeaching a witness by way of a prior oral inconsistent
statement allegedly made to the cross-examining attorney. The
Code of Professional Responsibility contains several provisions
which might prohibit such impeachment. Under DR 5-102(A)
counsel must withdraw if he or she will be a witness. In addition,
DR 7-106(C)(3) precludes counsel from "asserting his personal
knowledge of the facts in issue, except when testifying as a
witness." Nonetheless, cross-examiners frequently put questions
to the witness in the form of "didn't you tell me" thereby pitting
the credibility of the witness against that of the examining
counsel. This technique is particularly prejudicial in criminal
cases. For purposes of illustration, consider the following line of
questioning:
Q. Now, it is true, isnt' it, Mr. [Defendant], that you have sold
some records through your shop that were boosted or stolen or
that you had reason to believe were boosted or stolen?
95. The award was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1021, 1023 and 1927.
Section 1927 was amended in 1980 to provide:
§ 1927. Counsel's liability for excessive costs.
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court
of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be re-
quired by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. (em-
phasis added)
Compare the same counsel's conduct in Neusus v. Sponholtz, 369 F.2d 259, 260
n.2 (7th Cir. 1966) and O'Shea v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc., 233 F.2d 530, 533 (7th Cir.
1956). See also Smith v. Covell, 100 Cal. App. 3d 947, -, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377,
383-84 (1980):
In cross-examination, [defense counsel] asked [plaintiff] whether Dr.
Sternback or some other doctor had "told her" or "said" that her in-
jury was a method "of getting attention" or "demonstrating
dependence" or "hostility," thus suggesting some qualified doctor
had formed an opinion that Mrs. Smith's problems were purely
psychological. Objections to such questions were overruled. No
evidence was later offered to support these insinuations.
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A. I don't think I have, sir.
Q. Did we have conversation during a hearing here on 6 April of
1977 concerning whether or not you were dealing in boosted
items?
A. I don't remember that.
Q. Do you recall telling me that you did sell boosted items but it
wasn't in the quantities I thought?
A. I don't remember that either, sir.9
D. "It's For Impeachment"
The efforts of counsel to present evidence "through the back
door" when its admission as substantive evidence is prohibited by
an exclusionary rule are often as outrageous as they are ingenious.
For example, in Cote v. Rogers,97 defense counsel wished to get
before the jury an article concerning an automobile accident that
was the subject of the litigation. After attempting unsuccessfully
to introduce the article through a highway patrolman, either as
part of the patrolman's "expert testimony" or as a "public or
semi-public document," counsel arranged for its appearance in the
local newspaper on the second day of trial, and its broadcast on a
radio station that evening. He attempted to justify his conduct by
insisting that his part-time job as City Attorney was:
... often dependent upon a good relationship. with the only
newspaper in the community. The more items of newsworthy interest
96. United States v. Cardarella, 570 F.2d 264, 267 (8th Cir. 1978). See also
United States v. Puco, 436 F.2d 761, 762 (2d Cir. 1971) (involving a series of ques-
tions, each beginning "Did you tell me..." or "Do you recall me asking you
... "). In Jackson v. United States, 297 F.2d 195, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1961) Judge, now
Chief Justice, Burger, opined:
In the trial of this case trial counsel asked the detective if he recall-
ed a telephone conversation in which the officer told defense counsel
that he did not see the defendant with anything in his hand; that he
hadn't seen him drop anything in his hand; and that what he said he
saw was the defendant making some sort of motion which he inter-
preted to be a pitching motion, and that he didn't see him drop
anything. The officer categorically denied such a conversation.
No effort was then made by defense counsel to follow this line of
questioning with proof of the alleged 'facts' or of the assumptions im-
plicit in the questions. To be sure, it might have been awkward for the
lawyer to take the stand and testify, but if he was not prepared to do
this, even if it meant withdrawing from the case he should not have
asked the questions. Counsel asking such questions with no intention
of following them up if the answers were negative, would be subject to
severe censure.
97. 201 Cal. App. 2d 138, 19 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1962).
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that a person in such a position can furnish to the press the better the
relationship. Presumptively juries do not read, nor are they influenc-
ed by articles in newspapers. 8
A more common and sophisticated technique is to introduce
otherwise inadmissible evidence for a more limited, but proper
purpose. Frequently, such efforts are completely disingenuous.
Returning to a previous case 99 in which the defense hoped to sug-
gest that the plaintiff's symptoms were manufactured, the follow-
ing questions were propounded:
Q. Did he [a psychiatrist] tell you in a sense that the pain that you
were having was a method of obtaining dependency?
A. Repeat that. I don't understand it.
Q. Did he tell you that the pain you were experiencing was a
method by which you would get attention, a method by which
you could be dependent on other people?
A. No. I don't remember that.
Q. Did he tell you that your pain represented a method by which
you could express hostility?
A. No.
Defense counsel overcame the plaintiff's objections to this line
of inquiry by arguing that the questions were proper for impeach-
ment purposes. The appellate court reversed. After noting that
the questions called for "patent hearsay evidence" for which no
exception was cited, the court observed:
Unless such opinions were true and in fact stated to Mrs. Smith by
Dr. Sternbach, they would have no bearing upon her credibility for
impeachment purposes. No such foundation was tendered. The
barefaced claim that question was for impeachment does not circum-
vent the bar of hearsay rule. The claimed out-of-court declarations do
not come within any cited exception to the hearsay rule. California
courts have repeatedly held attempts to suggest matters of an eviden-
tiary nature to a jury other than by the legitimate introduction into
evidence is misconduct whether by questions, argument or other
names. (emphasis added)
A particularly skillful job of "laying the foundation" for the in-
troduction of evidence of a subsequent remedial measure "for im-
peachment purposes" was the subject of an opinion in Daggett V.
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co.' In that case the plaintiff
98. Id. at __, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 770. Needless to say, plaintiff's motion for a new
trial was granted.
99. Smith v. Covell, 100 Cal. App. 3d at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377 at 384.
100. 48 Cal. 2d 655, 313 P.2d 557 (1957). A particularly critical discussion of the
cross-examination in this case is presented in O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at
177-182.
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widower sought to recover for the wrongful death of his wife and
children which resulted from a collision between their car and
defendant's train at a crossing. At the time of the accident the
general railroad speed limit was ninety miles per hour. After the
accident, the railroad reduced the speed limit to fifty miles per
hour. Although this subsequent remedial measure could not have
been admitted as proof of the railroad's negligence, the changed
speed limit was admitted to impeach the engineer on the theory
that he had testified that the speed limit at the crossing in ques-
tion was still ninety miles per hour. Over a vigorous dissent by
Justice Schauer, the Supreme Court of California ruled that the
reduction of the speed limit was properly brought to the attention
of the jury for impeachment purposes.101
It is interesting to observe that the attorneys for the defendant
railroad, which claimed to have been aggrieved by this "sly
trick,"102 failed to request a limiting instruction (admittedly, an in-
101. Justice Schaver made the following analysis of Melvin Belli's cross-
examination:
... the record affirmatively shows that at no time did the witness,
Benton, testify that the limitation for the crossing remained at 90
miles an hour at the time of trial... Morever, any confusion as to
speeds, times, and districts or areas appears from the record to have
been invited and brought about by counsel for plaintiffs, who then
seized upon such alleged confusion as an excuse to get before the jury
otherwise inadmissible evidence of a change in the speed limitation
after the accident.., it is apparent that counsel for plaintiffs, by sw-
inging back and forth between past tense and present tense, and by
discussing speed restrictions without specific indication of whether
he referred to restrictions within entire railroad districts or to restric-
tions at a smaller area within a district (such as at the Plaza Street
crossing here involved), succeeded in confusing not only Benton, the
witness, but also the court itself. Counsel then seized upon the confu-
sion which he himself had engendered, to not only bring before the
jury the fact that the restriction at the Plaza Street crossing had been
changed to 50 miles, but to emphasize that the change had taken
place subsequent to the accident. The admission of such improper
evidence could not, and did not, tend to impeach the witness, who at
no time had testified that the Plaza Street intersection speed had re-
mained at 90 miles an hour up to the time of trial; on the contrary, the
witness had clearly stated that the overall restriction in the fourth
district (i.e., from Fullerton to San Diego) remained at 90 miles, but he
had also several times referred to "curve restrictions and other forms
of restrictions" within districts - references which were plainly
understood by plaintiff's counsel, who himself likewise referred to
such lesser restrictions. Inasmuch as the issue of negligence on the
part of defendants was close, it appears that the error of admitting
such evidence of changed conditions was prejudicial.
102. The characterization is O'Connell's, supra note 4, at 177.
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effectual instruction) directing the jury to consider the evidence of
a reduction in the speed limit only as an aid to assessing the
credibility of the engineer. Accordingly, they could not claim on
appeal that the evidence was improperly used as proof of
negligence. 103
The propriety of such a cross-examination is subject to argu-
ment. Indeed it has been argued that since EC 7-25 declares that a
lawyer should not by subterfuge put before a jury matters which
it cannot properly consider, it might be unethical for a lawyer to
offer limited purpose evidence he knows the jury will consider
more generally in spite of the instruction of the court.10 4
V. Summation
In an earlier day, charges of misconduct during closing argu-
ment were likely to receive short shrift. As one judge opined:
No lawyer has the right to misrepresent or misstate the testimony.
On the other hand, he is not required to forego all the embellishments
of oratory, or to leave uncultivated the fertile field of fancy. It is his
time-honored privilege to -
"Drown the stage in tears,
Make mad the guilty and appall the free
Confound the ignorant, and amaze indeed
The very faculties of eyes and ears."
The sorrowing "grey-haired parents," upon the one hand, and the
broken-hearted "victim of man's duplicity," upon the other, have
adorned the climax and peroration of legal oratory from a time
"whence the memory of man runneth not to the contrary," and for use
at this late day to brand their use as misconduct would expose us to
just unsure [sic] for interference with ancient landmarks.105
103. 48 Cal. 2d at __, 313 P.2d at 564.
104. KEETON, supra note 22, at 48 n.6. Under the cited provision, it would cer-
tainly be unethical for counsel to argue as substantive evidence that which the
court admitted subject to a limiting instruction. See, e.g., Croley v. Huddleston,
301 Ky. 580, 192 S.W. 2d 717 (1946), and text at note 112, infra.
There are, of course, other tricks in the "black bag" of cross-examination,
which need not be covered in detail. On cross-examination based upon exhibits
not in evidence see Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir.
1968); Mangan v. Broderick and Bascom Rope co., 351 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1965);
Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, __, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 189-90 (1964). On
questions directing a witness to characterize the testimony of others as true or
false, see Ryan v. Monson, 33 Ill. App. 2d 406, 179 N.E.2d 449 (1961).
105. State v. Burns, 119 Iowa 663, __, 94 N.W. 238, 241 (1903); See also
Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 343, -, 39 S.W. 341, 343 (1897):
Tears have always been considered legitimate arguments before a
jury, and, while the question has never arisen out of any such
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Notwithstanding counsel's traditional right to a certain
rhetorical license in "summing-up," today's trial attorney must
take care to observe his ethical obligations to the tribunal, to the
opposing party, counsel, and witnesses, and to his own client.106
My purpose is not to restate the law of summation generally,
10 7
but only to present examples of violations of the disciplinary
rules: the injection of irrelevant and inflamatory matter,08 argu-
ment on the basis of facts not in the record,'0 9 the assertion of per-
sonal opinion or belief," 0 and the vituperation of opposing counsel
and witnesses.'
A. Greasy Kid Stuff
Any attorney who has undertaken the defense of a large cor-
poration or an insurance company has suffered it-the tactic that
behavior in this court, we know of no rule or jurisdiction in the court
below to check them. It would appear to be one of the natural rights of
counsel which no court or constitution could take away. It is cer-
tainly, if no more, a matter of the highest personal privilege. Indeed, if
counsel has them at command, it may be seriously questioned
whether it is not his professional duty to shed them whenever proper
occasion arises, and the trial judge would not feel constrained to in-
terfere unless they were indulged in to such excess as to impede or
delay the business of the court. (emphasis added)
But see Barzclis v. Kulikowski, 418 F.2d 869, 870 n.1 (5th Cir. 1969) (in the course
of ruling that counsel's "poetry" was sour, the court stated: "We have a low opi-
nion of the planting of this kind of corn in a federal courtroom.")
106. Compare Daily v. Pere Marquette R.R., 197 Mich. 340, 163 N.W. 883
(1917):
We cannot understand how counsel will be so unjust to clients as to
make arguments which counsel must know are improper, and, if they
are at all familiar with the decisions of this court, also know will result
in the reversal of the judgment.
107. For a more general treatment of the subject see Kornblum, The Voire Dire,
Opening Statement, and Closing Argument 23 PRAC. LAW 11 (1977); Levin and
Levy, Persuading the Jury with Facts not in Evidence: The Fiction Science Spec-
trum, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 139 (1956); Comment, Improper Argument of Counsel,
19 ALA. L. REV. 75 (1977); Note, Final Argument In Iowa, 15 DRAKE L. REV. 115
(1965); Note, The Scope of Permissible Comment In A Civil Action In Kentucky,
58 Ky. L. J. 512 (1970);
108. DR 7-106(C)(1), Model rule 3.4(e). See also ABA STANDARDS RELATING To
THE, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION 5.8(c) and
DEFENSE FUNCTION 7.8(c) (Tent. Draft 1979) [Hereinafter cited as ABA STAN-
DARDS _ ].
109. DR 7-106(c)(1), Model Rule 3.4(e). See also ABA STANDARDS: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION 5.9 and DEFENSE FUNCTION 7.9.
110. DR 7-106(C)(4); Model Rules 3.4(e). See also ABA STANDARDS: PROSECU-
TION FUNCTION 5.8(b) and DEFENSE FUNCTION 7.8(b).
111. DR 7-106(C)(6), Model Rule 3.4(e).
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is somewhat charitably referred to as "dehumanizing the defen-
dant." For example, in spite of the well established and salutary
rule that the relative wealth or poverty of a party is ordinarily in-
admissible, and that arguments regarding the wealth of the defen-
dant are improper (unless about a legitimate claim for punitive or
exemplary damages), deliberate incitement of bias along such
lines continues to generate a surprising number of reported ap-
pellate opinions. Consider the following examples.
In Love v. Wolf,1 12 plaintiff brought an action against a physi-
cian and a drug manufacturer for "serious and severe anemia"
allegedly caused by administration of chloromycetin, an an-
tibiotic. Reversing a $334,046.00 verdict for plaintiff the appellate
court stated:
Here it cannot be said that the wealth of Parke-Davis was relevant to
any issue. Proof of its sales, however, expressed either in grams or
dollars, was relevent to show a motive or reason for the alleged over-
promotion of the drug, a definite issue in the case... but only for a
proper purpose, and under instructions of the court limiting it to that
proper purpose.
This does not mean that having elicited the evidence for a proper and
limited purpose, a party's attorney may thereupon, by argument,
urge its reception by the jury for an improper purpose. This is what
occurred here. [Plaintiff's counsel] could have argued with propriety
to the jury that a large sales volume furnished a reason or motive for
over-promotion and therefore made plaintiff's evidence of the latter
believable. But he could not properly argue that the jury should allow
large damages because the defendant was rich or because it could well
afford to be held to absolute liability as a price for marketing
chloromycetin.
. . .Where it appears in a case that either party has purposely and
designedly stressed the point of the comparative wealth of the par-
ties, we are then presented with a question of wilful misconduct, and
the case will be treated accordingly.
Here the misconduct of plaintiff's counsel was first in arguing un-
proved profits and then in using his assertion as the basis of bias-
incitement.'"
Similarly, in Draper v. Airco, Inc."4 a wrongful death action
brought against United States Steel Corporation, Airco, Inc., and
112. 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964).
113. Id at _ 38 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
114. 580 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1978).
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W.V. Pangbourne & Co., arising from the electrocution of a
lineman who was installing a switch on an energized line on
premises owned by U.S. Steel, counsel for the plaintiff made
repeated references to the wealth of defendants and then carried
on "somewhat incoherently:"
I am going to make the equalizer between the multimillion dollar
there for [Plaintiff] and her kids, it's right here. On that side of the
room are bills of dollars and on this side of the room is the
equalizer .... [1n this case I brought you the giants, the giants of the
industrial world... I am going to ask you to tumble the magnificent
big companies here with all their engineers."'
A jury verdict for $585,789.55 was gained, and then lost.
A different variety of appeal to passion and prejudice
permeated counsel's summation in Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck
and Co, 11 6 a product liability action brought against a manufac-
turer and retailer of tires for a death allegedly caused by tire
failure. The appellate court reversed a $450,000 award' 7 relying in
part on counsel's discussion of: the value of his life; counsel's per-
sonal association with the deceased; the image of children crying
at graveside; and the need for retribution.
1 18
115. Id at 95.
116. 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975).
117. The Trial court had reduced a $900,000 verdict to $400,000 to cure the
taint of bias and prejudice injected by counsel's summation. Id. at 280-81.
118. The following excerpts from the arguments of counsel were set out in the
opinion:
You will decide what is the dollar value of the loss of a husband and a
father, one who earns and provides, loves, guides, comforts, consoles,
protects and even punishes children. Now my partner .... has a little
six year old boy who probably couldn't and wouldn't know enough
about the value of money to know what price he might want to put on
a daddy, but I don't believe my sixteen year old would take three
million dollars for me - that may sound selfish, but he knows the
value of money, but I believe he'd rather have me.
Now I feel a heavy burden right now, and I think all of you know
that. I feel the heavy burden because this young redheaded lawyer
has to close this argument. This young lawyer has to say the last
things that will be said for .... the widow of [the deceased]. And the
last thing that can be said for that baby that's asleep there. And the
last thing for this little girl that can be said. So I feel a heavy burden.
I feel a heavy burden because [the deceased] was my friend from
Seminary; that we grew up together and were friends for a long time.
Not one person that's been on this witness stand in nine days will ap-
prove those claims. Not one. Didn't make any tests until after.., is
dead and in the grave. My goodness, they ought to have been at the
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In theory, at least, it is the duty of counsel for the parties, as
well as the court, to prevent the jury from considering the ex-
traneous and the irrelevant, and to insure that verdicts are
rendered on the basis of evidence presented on issues made by the
pleadings. 119 The American bar all too often appears to be preoc-
cupied with circumventing this ideal. 10
grave to hear that child cry and say, "I want my Daddy" and to
watch that child wait on the doorsteps of its home for its Daddy to
return. But they weren't there because they had sold the tires. Maybe
after this case - maybe after this one they won't be able to make
those claims. Maybe there won't be many more children sitting on the
doorstep waiting for Daddy to come home, and he never comes home
because they couldn't back up what was in that Owner's Manual.
Now I say to you when every expert says you ought to have four more
p. s. i. above 75, and Sears says you ought to have only 24 up to 100,
and I say to you when they make the 40,000 miles at 110 miles a lie
without failure tread body would separate - when they say those
things to you they're playing games - with human life. And they
played a ruthless, horrible, mistaken game on [the deceased]'s life.
Why? For the sale of tires. Put that air pressure down there 24 so
they'll ride soft and you'll sell them tires. Put those ads on the televi-
sion. Put those pamphlets out without any claim. Playing games with
human life - except it caught them in this case. It caught them in
this case.
I say to you they got the profit off the tires. Pay the lady and the
children for his death. Pay the children and the lady for his death -
for his thirty-three productive years .... They'd rather have him
here. But they don't, so pay them. Pay them. So that Sears would
remember and Michelin would remember that the next time they
write something down they'd be able to half way back it up.
119. Hockaday v. Red Line, Inc., 174 F.2d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also Cherry
Creek Nat. Bank v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 207 A.D. 787, __, 202 N.Y.S. 611, 614
(1924):
The rule confining counsel to legitimate argument is not based on eti-
quette, but on justice. Its violation is not merely an over-stepping of
the bounds of propriety, but a violation of a party's rights. The jurors
must determine the issues upon the evidence. Counsel's address
should help them do this, not tend to lead them astray.
120. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY, supra note 3, at 27-28:
The reasons punitive damages are often asked for although very
rarely enacted are illustrative of the manipulative, deceptive, subter-
ranean world of tort litigation. Plaintiffs' lawyers request them ... (1)
to inflame the jury against the defendant by the very terms of the ac-
cusation, regardless of whether the defendant's conduct in fact
justifies the accusation;... (3) to get evidence of the defendant's in-
come and net worth before the jury, supposedly to help it decide how
big a verdict will "punish" him, but in fact to implant the idea of the
defendant's wealth; ....
19821 DIRTY TRICKS
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B. Bushwacking
"Bushwacking" is a term that at least one court has used in
describing arguments presenting facts outside of the record. 2'
The term is particularly appropriate when a trial attorney resorts
to his own assertions of fact and substitutes his testimony as
proof, denying the opponent an opportunity to interpose objec-
tions based on exclusionary rules, or test the evidence through
cross-examination. 12 2
For example, a crucial issue in Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck and
Co.,'23 was the amount of air pressure necessary to assure safety
at speeds in excess of 75 miles per hour in tires manufactured by
the defendant. Plaintiff presented evidence to prove that a tire
pressure recommended in defendant's owner's manual was not
supported by actual tests as claimed. In closing argument plain-
tiff's counsel embellished his case by telling the jury that a Sears
representative had testified that the company knew its recommen-
dations were false and had therefore taken them off the market
after the deceased's death. The Court observed that the admission
attributed to the witness not only was unsupported by the record
but also would have been excluded at trial as a subsequent
remedial measure.' 24
C. Personal Opinion Or Belief
Closely related to the rule limiting argument to the record is the
rule stated in DR 7-106(C) that:
In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer
shall not:
(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when
testifying as a witness.
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to
the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil
121. Smith v. Wright, 512 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Ky. App. 1974).
122. Levin and Levy, supra note 106, at 144-45. Often such references are also
irrelevant and inflammatory. See, e.g., Williams v. Alaska, 629 P.2d 54, 58
(Alaska 1981) (references to hung jury in previous trial).
123. 512 F.2d at 285-6 nn. 10-13.
124. Id at 284-85. See also Draper v. Airco, Inc., 580 F.2d 91, 96 (3d Cir. 1978)
(condemning counsel's reference to his meetings and discussions with the deceas-
ed's children, none of whom had testified); Rommel-McFerran Co., v. Local Union
No. 369, 361 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1966) (citing as reversible error argument that
union's conduct in a deposition had not been introduced and admitted in
evidence).
[Vol. 6:265
HeinOnline  -- 6 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 304 1982-1983
DIRTY TRICKS
litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused; but he may
argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclu-
sion with respect to the matters herein.
Among the conventional justifications for the no-personal-belief
rule are:
First, an attorney's statement of his beliefs impinges on the jury's
function of determining the guilt or liability of the defendant. Second,
and more important, an attorney's statement of his beliefs injects in-
to the case irrelevant or inadmissible matter or facts not legally pro-
duced into evidence. By giving his opinion, an attorney may increase
the apparent probative force of his evidence by virtue of his personal
influence, his presumably superior knowledge of the facts and
background of the case, and the influence of his official position. If,
for example, an attorney states in his summation that he believes a
witness has lied, his statement suggests that he has private informa-
tion supporting his beliefs.2 5
By anyone's count, this is surely the most frequently violated
rule of ethics and argument. 26
The most blatant breaches of the no-personal-belief rule occur in
criminal cases when either the prosecutor or defense lawyer makes
an uninvited statement regarding his knowledge of or belief in the
defendant's guilt or innocence. 27 More frequent and perhaps more
innocent violations arise from efforts to discredit or accredit the
125. United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1978). See also EC
7-24 (".. . were the rule otherwise, the silence of a lawyer on a given occasion
could be construed unfavorably to his client.").
126. Cf D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 260 (1973).
127. State v. Vickory, 205 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1973) (prosecution in opening
statement); State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24 (Iowa 1975) (prosecution in closing,
opined"... I do believe that the man is guilty, and that you should, in fact,
render a verdict of guilty for him."). For a more subtle approach see United
States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 753 (6th Cir. 1979) ("If the United States did not
believe the defendant was guilty of committing these charges in the indictment,
based on the evidence that has been presented to you, this case, of course, would
have never been presented to you in the first place. It never would have been
presented to you."); Telfare v. State, 163 Ind. App. 413, 324 N.E.2d 270 (1975)
(".. . I swore I would... prosecute those who commit crimes, but I feel my job is
also to protect the innocent (inaudible), and I stand before you today with a clear
conscience."); State v. Henderson, 226 Kan. 726, 603 P.2d 613 (1979). See also
Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 482 Pa. 76, , 393 A.2d 386, 390 (1978) (defense
counsel's reference to himself (and his client) as "the good guys").
Similar conduct has been known to occur during voire dire examination of pro-
spective jurors. See Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, _ 116 Cal.
Rptr. 713, 719, 722, n.13 (1974) (references to appearance of psychologist at no
cost to defendant because of psychologist's belief in defendant's innocence, and
references to counsel's friendship and affection for the defendant justified finding
of contempt).
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testimony of witnesses. Indeed, many of the following comments
of counsel might be viewed as common, and perhaps acceptable,
by the casual observer:
Quite apart from Mr.-'s testimony, there is the testimony from
the aliens and there is the testimony from the Government officers
who have no interest in this case other than seeing that they are
upholding their sworn duty to see that the laws are not violated and
that individuals such as [defendant] who violate these Federal laws
are brought to justice." 8
Now after [defendant] has been caught in this rather apparent con-
tradiction, the lie, he didn't have the beer pitcher ....
If on the other hand, one of the possible conclusions should appear to
you to be reasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be
your duty to adhere to the reasonable deduction and to reject the
unreasonable - ladies and gentlemen, I don't believe [defendant's]
story, too many coincidences, too many slips and slides around the
facts.'"
Perhaps the line is too fine that permits the prosecutor to state
"I believe that the evidence has shown the defendant's guilt,"
1
"'
but prohibits him from stating "I believe that the defendant is
guilty"; or that invites him to opine that "No conflict exists in the
testimony of the prosecution's witnesses," 131 but precludes him
from stating "The prosecution's witnesses are telling the
truth.' 32 However, the following comments are clearly inap-
propriate in civil suits as well as criminal cases:
And I tell you, ladies and gentlemen, that she is an incredible witness,
and she is not worthy of your belief. She is a liar, clear and simple."',
128. United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d at 400 (improper aggrandizement of the
credibility of government offices; but error harmless).
129. State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, -_, 594 P.2d 146, 148 (1979) (harmless
error).
130. United States v. Wayman, 510 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
131. United States v. McDowell, 539 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir. 1976).
132. United States v. Lamerson, 457 F.2d 371, 372 (5th Cir. 1972).
133. Dukes v. State, 356 So.2d 873, 875 (Fla. App. 1978). In Olenin v. Curtin &
Johnson, Inc., 424 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1968), a personal injury case, the court
observed in its per curiam opinion:
It is unprofessional conduct, meriting discipline by the court, for
counsel either to vouch for his own witnesses or to categorize oppos-
ing witnesses as "liars"; that issue is for the jury ... we "must rely
primarily on the trial judges to make clear that they do not want such
argument," and we further pointed out that "disciplinary
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As I say, I have been making final arguments for 16 years, and I can't
remember ever using this word before in a final argument - lied. She
lied to you.'4
He lied to you, ladies and gentlemen. Why did he do that? Why did he
make that story up?
So why is he lying to you? It's just like Johnny lying about not
delivering the newspapers. Johnny would lie, and that's because he
took the snow shovel and tried to put it off on to somebody else.
When the defense put on its case, it was filled with falsehood, not a
grain of truth in this defense, ladies and gentlemen.
We are not basing our argument simply on the fact that he was there,
as Mr. L said, but he was there and he lies about where he
was .... 135
[The youth's] testimony is pretty incredible when you think of it.
Why did it take him so long to answer? - because he was making the
testimony up while he was sitting here.I'
D. The Brawlers
The media at times appears to idolize the "street-fighter," and
laymen who would ordinarily have nothing good to say about
lawyers in general, all want one by their side when their lives or
cash are at stake. Even so, the brawler's techniques, particularly
the deliberate abuse of opposing counsel, have no place at trial:
All of these matters rest within the control of the trial court, and the
trial court has the power and duty to preserve decorum. The trial
court can and should institute contempt proceedings against
recalcitrant counsel and impose either a fine or jail sentence.'37
mechanisms are available to the trial courts to deal with unlawyerlike
behavior."
Compare Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 427 F.2d 951,
956 (2d Cir. 1970).
134. State v. Williams, 297 Minn. 76, _ 210 N.W.2d 21, 24 (1973).
135. Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 130 (D.C. 1980).
136. Id With regard to this comment, the court explained:
Characterizing testimony as incredible is an accepted and proper
form of comment on contradictory testimony. But, the prosecutor ex-
ceeded the bounds of permissible comment by invading the province
of the jury's responsibility to assess the demeanor of witnesses when
he characterized the witness' pause as an opportunity to fabricate.
137. Eizerman v. Behn, 9 Ill. App. 2d 263, -, 132 N.E.2d 788, 799 (1956).
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The Code of Professional Responsibility provides in DR
7-106(C)(6) that "counsel should not engage in undignified or
discourteous behavior."'8 8 Consider the propriety of the following
exchanges in light of this standard.
Counsel approaches the defense table, and pointing out the
defense attorney, says:
I charge Mr. - [attorney for Airco] who had the mental poor guy
with no brain in there. I charge him, head of a $7,400,000 contract. I
charge him as part of the same conspiracy. And I charge Mr. - [at-
torney for Pangborne] who didn't have the decency to put a rubber
blanket around it or platform [sic] or anything else.
[And to imply that the same counsel had deliberately "deep sixed" re-
quested documents.]
Every time we get to a crucial spot, things disappear."9
Equally enlightening are the following remarks by an appellate
court:
Counsel's vilification and abuse of opposing counsel was reprehensi-
ble, although its effect to influence the jury was no doubt less pre-
judicial. Counsel for Parke-Davis was referred to as "an idiot"
(several times), a "smart guy," a "laughing hyena." When counsel ob-
jected to [counsel's] obviously-improper reference to Parke-Davis'
"astronomical profits," [counsel] replied: "Can I make a statement or
two without being interrupted, or do I have to floor you .... ?" This
was one of several similar expressions made to one or another oppos-
ing counsel who were also invited to "Step outside and do something
138. Compare Model Rules 3.5(c) and 4.4.
139. Draper v. Airco, Inc., 580 F.2d at 96. Compare Cecil v. Gibson, 37 Ill. App.
3d 710, -, 346 N.E.2d 448, 449 (1976).
In his closing argument defense counsel characterized plaintiffs' at-
torney as a "slick attorney from Chicago." Defense counsel referred
to plaintiffs' attorney as a "slick hired-hand" and also referred to
plaintiffs' medical expert witness as a "sidekick" and a "righthand
man."
Defense counsel claimed that plaintiffs' counsel "manufactured"
evidence, had a "wild imagination," and was not worthy of the jury's
trust. He further stated that plaintiffs' counsel was the "captain of
(the) ship" who was "piloting" the testimony of plaintiffs' expert
witness. In addition, defense counsel compared the relationship bet-
ween plaintiffs' counsel and his expert witness to that existing bet-
ween the "Cisco Kid and Poncho" and "Mat Dillon and Chester." The
expert was characterized as "a professional witness" who carries a
"shiny black leather bag" containing instruments that "have never
been used."
See also Ryan v. Monson, 33 Ill. App. 2d 406, -, 179 N.E.2d 449, 458 (1961);
and J. GOULDEN, THE MILLION DOLLAR LAWYERS 85 (1977) (dealing with attacks
on expert witnesses).
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about it." Their objections were characterized as "asinine" and as
"hogwash." They were accused of suborning perjury. When defen-
dant Wolf's attorney complained that he could not see the witness
(apparently because (counsel] during cross-examination had placed
himself between counsel and the witness) plaintiff's counsel asked if
the attorney was passing signals to the witness.
Opposing counsel, voicing objections, were frequently told to "shut
up" and the attorneys representing the several defendants who, of
course, had sometimes identical and sometimes widely contrapositive
interests on separate issues were accused of "sleeping together.-"
0
Conclusion
No author can hope to provide more than an introduction to the
subject of unethical practices at trial. Nor is it my intention to
suggest that the disciplinary docket will, or should, be crowded
with cases charging infractions of the disciplinary rules cited, or
other customs of proper court procedure. Many of the "dirty
tricks" that occur are simply the result of ignorance and inex-
perience." '4 On the other hand, it is the author's hope that a primer
on the subject will provide the beginner with an opportunity to
learn from the mistakes of others, and provide trial attorneys and
judges with a guide to help them spot, and respond to, deliberate
and recurring abuses.4 2
In addition, it is hoped that more trial judges will recognize and
exercise their inherent power to insure that litigation is conducted
in a fair, efficient, and sensible fashion,143 by dealing sternly with
such unfair tactics through the imposition of costs and money
sanctions'" and exercise of the contempt power,' 45 to discourage
calculated violations of the disciplinary rules.
140. Love v. Wolf, 266 Cal. App. 2d at - 38 Cal. Rptr. at 190. According to
the appellate court, the trial judge failed to protect defense counsel:
Excepting one mild characterization of conduct by counsel as "a little
bit disgraceful" (made in such a manner that a reader of the
transcript is left uncertain at which attorney the criticism was
directed) and several expressions of disgrace such as, "Let's all go
home. What do you say we all go home," there was almost no effort to
keep the proceedings within the confines of propriety.
141. Cf Ordover, The Lawyer as Liar, 2 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 305, 314 (1979).
Any instructor of trial advocacy or "litigation skills" will spend a good portion of
each class session pointing out improper questioning techniques, and improper
arguments in opening statements and summations.
142. See, e.g., text at nn.50 and 70.
143. See, e.g., Control Data Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Auth., 87 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1980).
144. See, e.g., Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978);
In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1976)
145. United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981). See also text at
n.138, supra.
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